2,467 research outputs found

    Project design with limited commitment and teams

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    We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show that the manager has incentives to extend the project as it progresses. This result has two implications. First, the manager will choose a larger project if she has less commitment power. Second, the manager should delegate the decision rights over the project size to the agents unless she has sufficient commitment power

    Peak-Hour Pricing Under Negative Externality: Impact of Customer Flexibility and Competitive Asymmetry

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    Several industries that provide services to customers (e.g., public utility and transportation) charge higher prices during peak hours to smooth demand. With technologies (e.g., electronic shelf labels) enabling retailers to change prices easily within each day, should supermarkets use peak-hour pricing? To examine this question formally, we introduce a stylized duopoly model in the presence of “negative externality,” where firms compete for congestion-averse customers. We characterize how customers endogenously segment themselves regarding when and where to shop, and then use the equilibrium outcomes to examine whether the firms should implement peak-hour pricing for varying types of customer flexibility and competitive asymmetry. Our analysis shows that, if customers are not flexible in their store choice, then both firms would always use peak-hour pricing. However, if store choice flexibility is present, then firms’ decisions depend on the competitive asymmetry as follows. If one firm has a clear competitive advantage (in terms of value or price) over the other firm, then the dominant firm will use peak-hour pricing, whereas the other firm will not. Otherwise, both firms will use peak-hour pricing if they engage in symmetric competition (in terms of similar value and price), or neither firm will use it if they engage in differentiated competition (high value versus low cost). Through our analysis of different extensions, we find that a firm’s ability to set its regular price would dampen the effect of peak-period pricing. Also, we obtain consistent results when there is heterogeneity in customer valuation and customer congestion aversion level

    Market Entry of a Socially Responsible Retailer

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    As consumers become more conscious about social issues, they gain an additional "social benefit" when purchasing from a socially responsible retailer (or brand). This trend has motivated more socially responsible retailers (or brands) to enter the market with a "pre-commitment" to donate a certain proportion of their (A) profits or (B) revenues for social causes. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model where a socially responsible retailer enters the market with an incumbent for-profit retailer and heterogeneous consumers. We examine the socially responsible retailer's pricing strategy and entry conditions, the impact of the socially responsible retailer's entry on the incumbent retailer's profit, and the conditions under which the incumbent retailer should deter (or tolerate) the socially responsible retailer's entry. Our equilibrium analysis generates the following insights. First, even if the incumbent retailer can profitably deter the socially responsible retailer's entry, the incumbent retailer can be better off tolerating it under certain conditions. Second, somewhat interestingly, the incumbent retailer is more likely to deter the type (B) retailer's entry even though such entry is less detrimental to the incumbent retailer

    Can Third-Party Sellers Benefit from a Platform’s Entry to the Market?

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    Because of the informational advantage of online marketplaces (i.e., platforms), it is a common belief that a platform’s market entry will be detrimental to third-party sellers who sell similar products on the platform. To examine the validity of this belief, we conduct an exploratory analysis using the sales data for a single product category provided by JD.com for the month of March 2018. Our analysis reveals an unexpected result. Upon the platform’s entry, third-party sellers who sell similar products can afford to charge a higher price, obtain a higher demand, and earn a higher profit. To provide a plausible explanation for this unexpected exploratory result, we develop a duopoly model that incorporates the changing competitive dynamic before and after the platform’s entry. Specifically, before entry, the platform earns a commission (based on the seller’s revenue), whereas the seller sets its retail price as a monopoly. After entry, the platform earns a profit generated by its direct sales in addition to the commission from the seller. In addition, the seller and the platform operate in a duopoly and engage in a sequential game. By examining the equilibrium outcomes associated with this sequential game, we identify conditions under which the platform’s entry can create a win-win situation for both parties. Specifically, these conditions hold when the platform’s market potential is moderate and when the platform’s entry creates a sufficiently high spillover effect on the seller, providing a plausible explanation for our empirical finding that the seller can benefit from a platform’s entry

    Reducing Cycle Time at an IBM Wafer Fabrication Facility

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    Product Development in Crowdfunding: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

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    Problem definition: Crowdfunding goes beyond raising funds. Entrepreneurs often use crowdfunding to solicit feedback from customers in order to improve their products, and may therefore prefer to launch their crowdfunding campaigns using basic versions of their products with fewer features. However, customers may not be persuaded by a campaign if the product appears to be underdeveloped. In view of this trade-off, a key question for entrepreneurs is how much to develop a product before launching a crowdfunding cam- paign. / Methodology/results: Analyzing a game-theoretical model and testing its predictions empirically, we study: 1) how the development level of a product at campaign launch, measured by the initial number of product features, in uences whether customers will make comments that help entrepreneurs improve the product; 2) whether entrepreneurs continue to improve the product during the campaign; and 3) whether the campaign is successful. We show that, as the number of product features at campaign launch increases, the likelihood that customers will make comments and that the product will be improved during the campaign first increases but then decreases. Furthermore, the likelihood of campaign success first increases but then decreases with the number of product features at campaign launch. Finally, by analyzing the interactions between customer feedback, product improvement, and campaign success, we show that customer feedback motivates entrepreneurs to improve the product during the campaign. Moreover, entrepreneurs should take account of the initial number of features and customer feedback when improving the product, because oth- erwise product improvements can harm campaign success. / Managerial implications: Our study provides practical insights on how entrepreneurs can use crowdfunding to aid product development and improve- ment. Specifically, entrepreneurs should avoid overdeveloping their products before crowdfunding campaigns because, as well as decreasing the chance of campaign success, this could hinder their ability to save devel- opment costs (e.g., market research costs) through involving customers in product development

    Omecamtiv Mecarbil Enhances the Duty Ratio of Human \u3cem\u3eÎČ\u3c/em\u3e-Cardiac Myosin Resulting in Increased Calcium Sensitivity and Slowed Force Development in Cardiac Muscle

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    The small molecule drug omecamtiv mecarbil (OM) specifically targets cardiac muscle myosin and is known to enhance cardiac muscle performance, yet its impact on human cardiac myosin motor function is unclear. We expressed and purified human ÎČ-cardiac myosin subfragment 1 (M2ÎČ-S1) containing a C-terminal Avi tag. We demonstrate that the maximum actin-activated ATPase activity of M2ÎČ-S1 is slowed more than 4-fold in the presence of OM, whereas the actin concentration required for half-maximal ATPase was reduced dramatically (30-fold). We find OM does not change the overall actin affinity. Transient kinetic experiments suggest that there are two kinetic pathways in the presence of OM. The dominant pathway results in a slow transition between actomyosin·ADP states and increases the time myosin is strongly bound to actin. However, OM also traps a population of myosin heads in a weak actin affinity state with slow product release. We demonstrate that OM can reduce the actin sliding velocity more than 100-fold in the in vitro motility assay. The ionic strength dependence of in vitro motility suggests the inhibition may be at least partially due to drag forces from weakly attached myosin heads. OM causes an increase in duty ratio examined in the motility assay. Experiments with permeabilized human myocardium demonstrate that OM increases calcium sensitivity and slows force development (ktr) in a concentration-dependent manner, whereas the maximally activated force is unchanged. We propose that OM increases the myosin duty ratio, which results in enhanced calcium sensitivity but slower force development in human myocardium
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